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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDD E. PROVONSHA and ISABELLA 
B. PROVONSHA, GEORGE II. PAT-
TERSON, WILLANA C. PATTER-
SON, LULA M. WHITNEY and 
ELIZABETH ANNE WHITNEY, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
E~IIT T. PITTMAN, HANNAH B. PITT-
MAN, :MATTIE A. GARLETT and 
STANDARD URANIUM: COMPANY. 
a corpor.ation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
8503 
BRIEF OF THE DEFENDANTS AND 
RESPONDENTS, E~IIT T. PITTMAN, 
HANNAH B. PITTMAN, and 
MATTIE A. GARLETT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a boundary line dispute case between the 
Plaintiffs .and Appellants and the Defendants, Emit T. 
Pittman, Hannah B. Pittman, and ) [attie A. Gar lett, the 
Respondents herein, in which the only i ~sue is whether 
under the facts the Respondents above named have es-
tablished title to the overlapping or disputed portion of 
land in controversy against the record title of the Appel-
lants. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This .action was commenced by the Appellants, Plain-
tiffs below, to establish the boundary line between a 
tract of land owned by them and adjoining land owned 
by the Respondents, Defendants below, in Grand County, 
Utah. Appellants claim title to the land in dispute under 
a deed while Respondents claim title under the doctrine 
of boundary by acquiescence. From .a judgment quieting 
title to the disputed area in Respondents, Appellants 
prosecute this appeal. 
On July 27, 1896 the title to Block 1, Moab Town-
site, was vested in Olous Johnson and on said date the 
Seventh Judicial District Court in and for Grand County, 
Utah, granted Catheren.a Johnson, wife of Olous John-
son, a decree of divorce from Olous Johnson. Said di-
vorce decree provided, among other things, that the said 
Catherena Johnson was the owner in fee simple of the 
North Half of Block 1, Moab Townsite. Since the time 
of the said divorce the South Half of said Block 1, has 
been owned by different people from those who have 
owned the North Half, with the exception of a small 
piece of land owned by Standard Vranium Company, 
which belonged to the Appellant, Edd E. Provonsha, and 
which land is not involved in this appeal. (Abstracts 
of title 1narked "Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1," and "Defendants' 
PJxhibits 7 and 8. ") 
There has been a fence running East and West 
through said Block 1 which roughly divided said Block 
1, Moab Townsite, in two parts since the summer of 
1898 at least (Tr. 178). Said fence has been in existence 
and visible and treated as t11e boundary for the past 58 
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years. At least one permanent improvement w.as estab- ' 
lished on said premises prior to 1930 which has re-
mained there ever since. 
In this case there is no evidence of any express 
agreement in locating the fence line and no evidence 
that the fence in question was built for any other pur-
pose except to divide the property and to he treated as 
the boundary line. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S DECISION IS NOT BASED ON ANY 
PRECONCEIVED NOTION AS TO WHERE THE BOUNDARY 
LINE BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFFS' AND DEFENDANTS' 
PROPERTY LINE SHOULD LIE AND IS NOT CONTRARY 
TO THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT. 
POINT II • 
THE TRIAL COURT DOES NOT IGNORE THE OFFI-
CIAL PLAT OF MOAB OR THE CITY ORDINANCES AS 
STATED BY APPELLANT. 
POINT III 
EA.CH OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT MADE BY THE 
TRIAL COURT IN ARRIVING AT ITS CONCLUSION THAT 
THE FENCE LINE WAS THE ESTABLISHED AND AGREED 
BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE APPELLANTS AND THE 
RESPONDENTS UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY 
LINE BY ACQUIESCENCE IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT IV 
THE DECISION IS NOT AGAINST JUSTICE AND 
EQUITY AS CLAIMED BY APPELLANTS. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S DECISION IS NOT BASED ON ANY 
PRECONCEIVED NOTION AS TO WHERE THE BOUNDARY 
LINE BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFFS' AND DEFENDANTS' 
PROPERTY LINE SHOULD LIE AND IS NOT CONTRARY 
TO THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT. 
The arguments of the Appellants that: 
"The court's decision is based on its precon-
ceived notion as to where the boundary line be-
tween plaintiffs' property should be" and 
"Most of the trial was consumed by the court 
itself and the attorney for the defendants in an 
unsuccessful attempt to make the fence on Lots 
3 and 4 correspond with smne hypothetical survey lD. 
term~ 'finding Mo.ab' by the Court" fuR: 
are scurrilous, unfounded and not deserving of answer. 
A reading of the transcript will reYeal to anyone 
interested who consun1ed "nwst of the ti1ne at the trial." 
A study of the evidence presented at the trial will l f. 
demonstrate that the findings of the trial court are fully 
supported by the evidence and are not based on any 
"preconceived notions." 
Therefore, without laboring Point No. 1 further, 
Respondents will devote their attention to the issues 
properly before this court on a ppt>al, rather than to de-
vote further time to biased and unsupported assertion 
of a disappointed party litigant. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DOES NOT IGNORE THE OFFI-
CIAL PLAT OF MOAB OR THE CITY ORDINANCES AS 
STATED BY APPELLANT. 
The Appellants, on page 42 of their brief, make cer-
tain statements which are quoted in part .as follows: 
"The finding in this case that as of 1898 there 
was no plat of any kind available * * * the court 
has decided that there is no official plat of Moab 
Townsite and that the only presumably correct 
survey would be a survey starting from the 
Southeast Corner of Section 1." 
Even a cursory review of the written Findings of 
Fact signed by the trial court on the 31st day of January, 
A.D. 1956 will convince even the most skeptical reader 
that the trial court in this case did not make written 
Findings of Fact quoted above. 
The only written findings made by the trial court 
referring to the survey now existing and now adopted 
by the City of Moab is Finding No. 9 and the only written 
finding which makes reference to any Section Corner is 
Finding No. 10. Said Findings read as follows: 
"9. That the survey now existing and now 
adopted by the City of Moab, is not accurate and 
is off at least two feet. 
"10. That if a measurement was taken from 
the Northwest corner of Section 1, Townshin 26 
South, Range 21 East, Salt Lake Base and Meri-
dian, in which the subject property is located, that 
it would place the dividing line between the North 
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and South half of Block 1, Moab Townsite, seven 
(7) feet North of said dividing line as measured 
from the new Moab Townsite Survey." 
The Appellants further state on Page 39 of their 
brief as follows: 
"What the court is doing is giving greater 
credence to the survey made by the witness Otho 
Murphy than to the survey made by the Metro-
politan Engineers and the San Juan Engineers 
without any basis for doing so. Even if we do 
believe the testimony of Otho Murphy, that the 
survey is 2 feet off, this testimony would place 
the town plat 2 feet further south, in which event 
the fence would be a distance of 9.5 feet to 17.1 
feet north of the property line, which is directly 
contradictory to the finding that the fence line 
would fall 7.7 feet north of the new survey." 
It is submitted that there is no testimony by Metro-
politan Engineers or any of their agents concerning any 
survey and the Appellants' reference to San Juan Engin-
eers can only refer to the testimony of George Utermohle, 
.Jr., one of Appellants' witnesses, 1vho testified as follows: 
"Q. (By Mr. Hanson) Now did you go out 
to the property and make a rough check of the 
property lines along the west side, by that I mean 
is, did you, let me back up a little bit. Did you go 
down to the property and do any surveying at all7 
"A. Yes, sir, I did. I went to the City Engin-
eers, the Metropolitan Engineers at that time. 
There had been a question raised that Block 1 was 
laid out improperly, w.as not the right dimensions. 
I contacted the City Engineers; I asked them if 
Block 1 had been surve~red. They said it had. I 
asked the1n if the regular type of corners, "Thich 
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in town are accepted to be nails driven through 
bottle caps, they said the corners were there. And 
I asked him about the north-south dimensions of 
the block-" (Tr. 10) 
"Mr. Ruggeri: I request that the witness be 
instructed to answer the questions that are put 
to him and confine his testimony to those ques-
. tions. 
"Q. (By Mr. Hanson) Now, George, did you 
"The Court : Well, he hasn't done any harm 
yet. 
"Mr. Ruggeri: No, but he may. 
"Q. (By :Mr. Hanson) George, did you go 
down to the property, did you go down to Block 
1 and look at the property personally~ 
"A. Yes, sir. 
(Tr. 11) 
"Q. Mr. Utermohle, you may sit down if you 
want. When you surveyed Block 1, I think you 
stated that you started from bottle caps with a 
nail that was driven in the center of the street, 
is that right~ 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. Did the San Juan Engineering Company 
locate those points 1 
"A. No, sir. I know that they did not locate 
those points, actually put them in the street. I 
believe the Metropolitan Engineers did. 
"Q. In other words, you don't know who put 
the corners in the street out there for sure~ 
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"A. No, sir. I do not know who put that 
corner in the street. 
"Q. You measured from those corners and 
you based this survey on that measurement, Is 
that correct~ 
"A. That is correct, sir." 
(Tr. 25 and 26) 
Since the only testimony concerning surveys was 
!!lade by Otho Murphy and George Utermohle, Jr., both 
Appellants' witnesses, and since George Utermohle, Jr. 
did not know who placed the corner from ,~vhich he based 
his survey, it is equally apparent that he did not know 
if it was accurate; however, the Appellants' other wit-
ness, Otho ~furphy, stated that: (Tr. 130-131) 
"By Mr. Ruggeri: 
"Q. Otho, as I recall your testimony, you 
testified that a survey started, that if a surveyor 
were to start in the northeast corner of Section 1 
(indicating) and run his transit on a line that 
ran directlv east and then were to measure south 
to a point ~on1ewhere in the Block 1, l\foab Town-
site, that he would come out at a point 7.66 feet 
north of the point he shot at, I think was your 
words. 
"A. Yes, that is right. 
"Q. What did you 1nean 7.66 feet north of 
the point he shot at 1 
"A. Well, if he made his survey here on the 
north line by coming out from any point he could 
run as many angles as he wanted to if he was very 
careful and he would con1e out at a point 7.66 feet, 
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seven and a fraction feet, north of .any point that 
he was trying to find along the (indicating) -
"Q. Along the what~ He would come out, 
I think you said, a point 7.66 north~ 
"A. A point 7.66 feet north of any point 
that he would be trying to find along the east 
line, say of Section 1. 
"Q. So that if a person, if a surveyor had 
started .at the northeast corner of Section 1. 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. -and run his survey by turning an 
angle directly east -
"A. Yes. 
"Q. -and then come south to a point along 
the east-
"A. Yes. 
"Q. -edge of lot or Block 1, Moab Townsite, 
he would come out at a point 7.66 feet north of 
the point he was shooting at, is that right~ 
"A. Well, in that case 99 feet would be 100 
feet west. He would come out perhaps a point 
7.62 or 3. 
"Q. And now .according to the map which 
has been introduced as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 4, the 
beginning fence line which runs between the prop-
erties east and west between the properties, the 
center fence line, is a point how far north of the 
corner as surveyed by the San Juan Engineers~ 
"1fr. Hanson: Now, just a minute. Just a 
minute, Otho. I would like to interpose my objec-
tion to that question on the ground that it is based 
on an improper foundation. It assumes that a per-
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son was attempting to arrive at the corner post 
shown on the property description on the Metro-
politan survey between the north block and the 
south block and not that he was trying to arrive 
at a, any given predetermined point on the east 
section line. 
"The Court: Well, I don't care what it as-
sumes. I want to know how far it is down there. 
"Q. (By Mr. Ruggeri) How far is it, Otho? 
"A. Well, according to this map it is seven 
and a half feet." 
"Q. (By Mr. Hanson) Let me ask you this, 
Otho. The survey that you did in the Tanner 
case, you find yourself two or three feet south of 
the Metropolitan Engineers, is that correct? (Tr. 
140) 
".A. Yes. 
"Q. .And the surveying you did in this case 
you found yourself two feet south of that done by 
the Engineers~ 
".A. Yes." 
"Q. .All right. Now if a person was to begin 
a survey from the northeast corner of Section 1 
for the ·purpose of establishing a fence line, they 
would come out at a different spot, would they 
not, than if the~~ had commenced that measure-
nlent from the southeast quarter of Section 1? 
".A. That is right. 
"Q. Is the distance, from your experience 
is the distance, coulrl it be off aE: n1uch as 7lh feet' 
•'.A. Oh, yes, it could be. 
"Q. Is there .any \vay with any certainty. 
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now, pardon me, take that out. Block 1lies in the 
southeast quarter of Section 1, does it not~ 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Is there any way with any certainty 
that you can establish by measuring by the section 
corners and establish with certainty the location 
of Block 1, Moab Townsite survey~ 
"A. According to .any knowledge I have I 
wouldn't say you could." 
It is clearly evident that Findings 9 and 10 of the 
trial court are fully supported by the only evidence on 
the subject and it should be noted that said evidence and 
the only evidence on the subject came from Appellants' 
own expert witness. 
POINT III 
EACH OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT MADE BY THE 
TRIAL COUR'T IN ARRIVING AT ITS CONCLUSION 'THAT 
THE FENCE LINE WAS THE ESTABLISHED AND AGREED 
BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE APPELLANTS AND THE 
RESPONDENTS UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY 
LINE BY ACQUIESCENCE IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE. 
The record in this case is silent on existence or non-
existence on an express agreement locating the subject 
fence line. 
The test to determine the establishment of a bound-
ary acquiescence is set forth by the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah in the 0ase of Ringwood et al v. Brad-
ford, 2 Utah 2d 119, 269 P. 2d 1053. The elements there-
in stated which give rise to a presumption of an agree-
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ment settlin~ uncertain or disputed boundaries are set 
forth in said Pacific Reporter at Page 1055 and read as 
follows: 
1. Occupation to a visible line marked defin-
itely by monuments, fences, or buildings, and 
2. Acquiescence in the line as the boundary, 
3. For a long period of years, 
4. By adjoining owners. 
This presumption may be rebutted by: 
1. Proof that there was actually no agree-
ment by the parties. (Which is not alone suffi-
cient to rebut the presumption discussed.) 
2. Proof that there could not h.ave been a 
property agreement. 
1ng: 
Factors showing the latter include the follow-
(a) X o dispute or uncertainty over 
boundary. 
(b) Line not intended as boundary. 
(c) No parties available to 1nake an 
agreement, and 
(d) Possible nristake or inadvertence in 
loc.ating the boundary line. 
1. OCCUPATION TO A VISIBLE LINE MARKED 
DEFINITELY BY FENCES AND BUILDINGS. 
'"Phe only and uneontradieted evidence of this case 
establishes that there was a division of the North and 
p;outh parts of Block l, l\loab Townsite, clearly marked 
h)· vi~ible line established hy a fence and a building. 
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'N. R. Th1cConkie, resident of Moab, Utah, since the 
last p.art of November, 1897 (Tr. 178), observed a fence 
dividing Block 1, Thioab Townsite, since the Sun1mer of 
1898 at least, and states that said fence has been there 
"all that time and has been clearly visible" (Tr. 189). 
Lilla \Vinbourn testified that she purchased Lot 2, 
Block 1, ~Ioab Townsite, in 1935 and .at the time she 
purchased said Lot 2, there was a fence at the North 
of the property and that the fence was clearly visible 
(Tr. 1G±), distinct, and easily seen and that said fence 
existed in the sa1ne position all during the time she owned 
the property and until she sold it in 1943 ( Tr. 165). 
Edd E. Provonsha, one of the Plaintiffs and Appel-
lants, testified on direct examination that he observed 
a shed in the vicinity of the shed shown on Exhibit 4 
and that he has observed it from time to time during the 
time he owned this property (Tr. 146). On cross exam-
ination .:\fr. Provonsha stated that he purchased Lots 3 
and 4, Bloek 1, ).foab Townsite, somewhere around 1945 
and that there w.as a center fence and a shed located 
about the center of Lots 2 and 3, Block 1, Moab Town-
site, and he had no trouble seeing them. 
}J abel ,Johnson testified that at the time her husband 
acq' . .1ired the property in 1908, there 1vas a barbed wire 
fence around the entire Lot 1, Block 1, _l\Ioab Townsite 
(Tr. 119) and that it w.as clearly visible (Tr. 120). Mabel 
,Johnson abo stated she saw a shed that had been there 
a long, long tirne (Tr. 116). 
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2. ACQUIESCEN·CE IN THE LINE AS THE BOUND-
ARY. 
W. R. McConkie testified that he was a brother-in-
law of George W. Johnson, who bought Lot 1, Block 1, 
Moab Townsite, about 1908, (Tr. 179-180) and that while 
George W. Johnson owned said lot, his visits to said 
property were frequent. 1\tlr. McConkie testified that the 
J ohnsons used the land up to the fence line and not be-
yond it, (Tr. 181) and that during the same period of 
time Lots 3 and 4, Block 1, Moab Townsite, were in 
cultivation and the owners used the land up to the said 
fence line and not beyond it, (Tr. 182) and that a part 
of Lots 1 and 2, Block 1, JYloab Townsite, were cultivated 
up to the fence line (Tr. 183). \V. R. J\1:cConkie also 
stated that part of Lot 1, Block 1, Moab Townsite, was 
used as a corral and that the North end of the corral was 
the fence line in dispute. 
J. Wesley Oliver testified that he purchased the 
property designated on the plat of Appellants' brief as 
"Garlett," which w.as bounded on the North and South by 
fences, from one Lilla Winbourn and that he bought the 
same with the understanding that he was buying what 
was "in the fence there." He further testified that both 
he and his neighbors used the land up to the fence lines 
and not beyond then1 (Tr. 172). 
H. W. Balsley testified that he purchased Lots 2 and 
4, Block 1, Moab Townsite, (Tr. 174) from Seth P.axton, 
State Bank Examiner and receiver of 1\loab State Bank, 
in 1925 and sold said land in 1934 to J. Pratt Allred (Tr. 
175) ; that there was a clearly visible fence dividing said 
I 
I moekl 
t Ome ~f 
1 l 
~F --~--
I jj 
I l~~l. l 
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Block 1 at the time he bought the land; that during the 
time of his ownership he never attempted to go beyond 
the fence in question to the South and his neighbors to the 
South never attempted to go beyond the fence in question 
to the North, and that he treated the fence in all respects 
as the boundary line (Tr. 177). 
Lilla Winbourn testified that between the years 1935 
and 1943 she used all the land up to the fence and that 
her neighbors on the North occupied the land up to said 
fence and not beyond it (Tr. 167). 
3. THE FENCE LINE EXISTED FOR A LONG PERIOD 
OF YEARS. 
H. W. Balsley testified that he purchased the North 
Half of Black 1, Moab Townsite, from the State Bank 
Examiner and Receiver of the Moab State Bank in 1925 
and sold the land to J. Pratt Allred on February 23, 1934 
(Tr. 175); that .at the time he purchased the land there 
was a clearly visible fence running East and West which 
roughly divided the North and South parts of said Block 
1. 
W. R. McConkie testified that there had been a fence 
running somewhere near the center of Block 1, Moab 
Townsite, dividing the North and South part of said 
Block 1 (Tr. 178), and W. R. ~IcConkie further testified 
that there has been a fence that would not be hard for 
anybody to see at least since the summer of 1898 ( Tr. 
179). That said fence has been there "all that time and 
has been clearly visible" (Tr. 179). 
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The Supreme Court of the State of Utah in the case 
of Ekberg et ux v. Bates ct ux, 121 Utah 123, 239 P. 2d 
205, stated on Page 208 .as follows: 
"The length of time necessary to establish a 
boundary of acquiescence has never been definite-
ly established in this jurisdiction. Each case must 
usually be determined on its own facts. - In the 
instant case as we have pointed out above there 
was .a period of actual acquiescence for more than 
7 years (the Utah limitations period for adverse 
possession) before appellants acquired their title 
and under ·all the circumstances shown herein that 
was a sufficient length of time to establish the 
line so that appellants are precluded from claim-
ing that it is not the true line." 
The Supreme Court in the case of Tripp '0. Bagley, 
et al., 74 Ut·ah 57,276 P. 912, said, quoting fron1 Page 916: 
'"So far as the length of time is concerned, 
the fence clain1ed by the defendants as marking 
the boundary line has been established for ,a suffi-
ciently long period to support the defendants' 
clai1n. It was erected in about the year 1870, and, 
according to the testnnony of defendants, it has 
remained in the same location until this suit was 
begun in 1922. '' 
In the instant case the fence has re1nained in the 
same location for the 58 years last past. 
4. THE OCCUPATION AND ACQUIESCENCE \VAS 
BY ADJOINING OWNERS. 
The cYid('lWP ( ~l b~trarts of title) ~ho,,-s that on the 
27th rln)· of .Jnl~-, 1.896, title to Block 1, :\[oab Townsite, 
was vc:;t<'o in one Olous Johnson and was by decree of 
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the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for Grand 
County, Utah, divided and Catherena Johnson was 
awarded the North half of said block. The abstracts 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1 and Defendants' Exhibits 7 and 
8) further show that except for the piece of land now 
owned by Standard Uraniun1 Company, which land is not 
an issue in this appe.al, the North half of Block 1 since 
said Johnson divorce on July 27, 1896, has been owned 
by different persons than the persons owning the South 
half, and at no time have said North and South halves 
been owned in common. In other words, the property 
has been held by adjoining owners and the occupation 
and .acquiescence in the said fence as the boundary line 
was by said adjoining owners. 
The Supre1ne Court of the State of Utah in Ekberg 
et u.r v. Bates et 1tx, 121 Utah 123, 239 P. 2d 205, held 
that the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence was ap-
plicable under the facts therein stated, which said f.acts 
as stated showed the fence in question was built at a time 
when the land in dispute was all owned by one man. The 
facts further showed that the Appellant, Ekberg, Jr., 
both before and .after he acquired the title to his land had 
always protested that he considered the fence was on his 
property. 
The fact situation in subject case is much stronge~r 
than in the case of Ekberg et ux v. Bates et ux. Here 
there is not even a claim on the part of the Appellants 
that any of the .adjoining owners prote·sted the location 
of the fence until after the l\1:urphy Survey conducted 
at the request of J. Pratt Allred in 1935, and the owner-
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ship of the disputed property and acquiescence in the 
fence as the boundary has always been by adjoining land 
owners. 
THE PRESUMPTION OF BOUNDARY AGREEMENT 
WAS NOT REBUTTED. 
There was no evidence regarding the initial construc-
tion and location of the fence nor any evidence as to why 
it was originally constructed or by whom. The absence 
of evidence of an express agree1nent brings this case 
within the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence as stated 
by the Supreme Court in Holmes v. Judge, 31 Utah 269, 
97 P. 1009, and reaffirmed in many cases thereafter. The 
doctrine as stated in Hummell v. Young, 1 Utah 2d 237, 
265 P. 2d 410, and cited with approval in Brown v. Milli-
ner, 232 P. 2d 202, is as follows quoting from 265 P. 2d 
411: 
"* • • that. in the absence of evidence that the 
owners of adjoining property or their prede-
cessors in interest ever made an express parol 
agreement as to the location of the boundary be-
tween them if they have occupied their respective 
pre,mises up to an open boundary line visibly 
marked by monun1ents, fences or buildings for a 
long period of tin1e and mutually recognized it 
as the dividing line between them, the law will 
imply an agreen1ent fixing the boundary as lo-
cated, if it can do so consistently with the facts 
appearing, and will not permit the parties nor 
their grantees to dep.art from such line. This rule 
is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of bound-
ary by acquiescence. The nile was recognized 
and applied in Holmes v. Judge, 31 Utah 269, 87 
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P. 1009, and in a long line of subsequent cases-
all cites in Brown v. Milliner, supra." 
THE PRESUMPTION WAS NOT REBUTTED BY ANY 
PROOF THAT THERE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN A PROP-
ERTY AGREEMENT BY ANY OF THE MEANS AVAIL-
ABLE UNDER THE OUTLINE SET FORTH ABOVE. 
A. DISPUTE OR UNCERTAINTY OF BOUNDARY. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah in the case 
of Brown v. lJ!!illiner, 120 Utah 16, 232 P. 2d 202, quoting 
from Page 208, stated as follows: 
"In some of the opinions of this court on the 
subject of disputed boundaries, there are state-
ments to the effect that the location of the true 
boundary must be uncertain, unknown or in dis-
pute before an agreement between the adjoining 
land owners fixing the boundary will be upheld, 
citing Tripp v. Bagley, supra, in support thereof. 
Such statements should be understood to mean 
that if the location of the true boundary line is 
known to the adjoining owners, they cannot by 
parol agreement establish the boundary elsewhere. 
As was pointed out in the Tripp case, such an 
agreement would be in contravention of the stat-
ute of frauds. But the Tripp case does not require 
a party relying upon a boundary which has been 
acquiesced in for a long period of time to produce 
evidence that the location of the true boundary 
was ever unknown, uncertain or in dispute. That 
the true boundary was uncertain or in dispute 
and that the parties agree upon the recognized 
boundary as the dividing line will be implied from 
the parties' long acquiescence. Roberts v. Brae, 
5 Cal. 2d 356, 54 P. 2d 698. In Holmes v. Judge, 
supra, this cou~t, speaking through Mr. Justice 
Frick, set forth the following requirements neces-
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sary to establish a boundary by acquiescence: The 
line must be open, visible, marked by monuments, 
fences or buildings and recognized as the bound-
ary for a long term of years. It was expressly 
stated by the court in that case that there was no 
evidence how the fence and building which were 
recognized as the boundary came to be erected, 
or that there was ever any dispute between the 
adjoining owners concerning the location of the 
true boundary, or that any question was ever 
raised as to its location until shortly before the 
plaintiff commenced his action." 
Although under the authority above cited it is not 
necessary for the party relying on a boundary which 
has been acquiesced in for a long period of time to pro-
duce evidence that the true boundary was ever unknown, 
uncertain or in dispute, the uncontradicted and only evi-
dence on the subject clearly shows that uncertainty 
or dispute did mos,t certainly exist here which fact is 
evidence from reading Respondents' Point No. 2 in tlris 
brief contained. This case is thus clearly distinguished 
in this respect from the ease of Tripp L Bagley, et al., 
74 Ptah 57, 276 P. 912, cited by the Appellants. 
In the case of Ekberg v. Bates, 121 Ftah 123, 239 
P. 2d 205, the Supreme Court of the State of Ptahl speak-
ing on the subject of dispute or uneertainty of boundary, 
reading from page 207 of said Pacifie Reporter, as 
follows: 
"In \Villie v. Local Realt~T Co., 110 Utah 5~3. 
175 P. 2d 718, this question was decided by this 
court adversely to appellants' contention. \Ye 
st81t~ed therein on page 723 of 175 P.: Defendant 
contends that there was no dispute or uncertainty 
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about the division line in this case because the 
deeds were clear and certain and each lot had the 
full frontage called for by the de;eds and therefore 
the rule relating to establishment of boundaries 
by acquiescence does not apply. It is true that the 
line called for by the deeds could have easily been 
ascertained by a survey. However, a boundary 
line may be uncertain or in dispute even though 
it is cap.able of being readily ascertained. The 
vital question is whether the adjacent owners 
when they fixed the line or acquiesced in its being 
fixed were uncertain or in dispute about the loca-
tion of the actual line." 
B. THERE IS NO PROOF THAT THE FENCE WAS 
EVER INTENDED OR REGARDED AS ANYTHING BUT A 
BOUNDARY. 
C. SINCE THE OLOUS JOHNSON DIVORCE IN JULY, 
1896, BOTH SIDES OF THE FENCE WERE OCCUPIED BY 
OWNERS OF THE RESPECTIVE TRACTS AND THERE-
FORE THERE HAS AT ALL TIMES IN QUESTION, BEEN 
PARTIES AVAILABLE TO MAKE AN AGREEMENT. 
D. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE FENCE WAS 
LOCATED BY MISTAKE OR INADVERTANCE. 
There is no testimony or evidence of any kind as to 
who constructed the fence in question or the circum-
stances surrounding its construction except that it was 
placed in its present position not later than the summer 
of 1898 and has rem.ained in the same position continu-
ously ever since that time (Tr. 178-179) and has been 
acquiesced in as the boundary line by the adjoining 
property owners. 
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POINT IV 
THE DECISION IS NOT AGAINST JUSTICE AND 
EQUITY AS CLAIMED BY APPELLANTS. 
The appellants cite and quote from the case of Tripp 
v. Bagley, et al., 74 Utah 57, 276 P. 912, which quotation 
appears at page 65 of appellants' brief and reads in part 
as follows: 
"If the defendants rely upon the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel as the basis for their claim to 
the land in dispute, the fact, that at no time was 
there any uncertainty as to the true boundary line 
defeats such claim." 
So that there will be no mistake or uncertainty about 
Respondents' position it should be made clear that the 
Respondents do not rely upon the doctrine of Equitable 
Estoppel, but rather do rely upon the rule repeatedly 
announced by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
and which is settled law in this jurisdiction and which 
was restated in the very ease relied upon by appellants. 
In Tripp v. Bagley, et a1., 74 Utah 57, 276 Pac. 912, the 
court stated the rule relied upon by Respondents to be as 
follows, quoting fron1 page 916 of said Pacific Reporter: 
"Holmes v. Judge, 31 Utah 269, 87 P. 1009; 
Moyer v. Langton, 37 Utah 9, 106 P. 509; Rydalch 
v. Anderson, 37 Utah 99, 107 P. 25; Young v. 
Hyland, 37 Utah 229, 108 P. 1124; Farr v. Thomas, 
41 Utah 1, 122 P. 906; Binford v. Eccles, 41 Utah 
457, 126 P. 333; Christensen v. Beutler, 42 Utah 
392, 131 P. 666; Tanner v. Stratton, 44 Utah 253, 
139 P. 940; Warren v. Mazzuchi, 45 Utah 712, 138 
P. 360; Van Cott v. Casper, 53 Utah 161, 176 P. 
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849. In these cases the rule is announced and re-
iterated that, where the owners of adjoining lands 
occupy their respective premises up to .a certain 
line which they mutually recognize as the bound-
ary line for a long period of time, they and their 
grantees n1ay not deny that the boundary line 
thus recognized is the true one. The general rule 
thus repeatedly enunciated has become the settled 
law in this jurisdiction. However, the question 
for determination in this c.ase is whe,ther the facts 
here bring it within the general rule or constitute 
an exception thereto." 
In Tripp l'. Bagley et al, the court further stated 
on page 917 of said Pacific Reporter as follows: 
"It thus becomes of controlling importance 
to determine whether two adjacent landowners 
may establish a boundary line between their lands 
by or.al agreement or by acquiescence for a long 
period of time, when there is no uncertainty as to 
the location of the true boundary line, and where 
it is known by them at all times that the boundary 
line sought to be established is not the true bound-
ary line. It should be kept in mind that we are not 
dealing with a case of adverse possession of land, 
as the term is defined by the laws of this state. 
Neither are we dealing with a case where any per-
manent improvements have been placed upon the 
land in reliance upon an established boundary 
line." 
The Utah case of Brown v. Milliner, 232 P. 2d 202, 
quoted above at page ________ of this brief states in part: 
"But the Tripp case does not require a party 
relying upon a boundary which has been acquies-
ced in for a long period of time to produce evi-
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dence that the location of the true boundary was 
ever unknown, uncertain or in dispute." 
It is pointed out that in the instant case, unlike the 
Tripp case, there has been at least one permanent im-
provement built on the fence line-question, that there is 
a dispute and uncertainty as to the true boundary, and 
it is respectfully submitted that the case of Tripp v. 
Bagley, et al., is clearly distinguished from the instant 
case and is therefore not controlling here. 
The appellants on page 66 of their brief make the 
following unfounded and untrue assertion: 
"The defendants' answer to plaintiffs' 
Amended Complaint and Counterclaim, the Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence 
in this case and Exhibit 4 all illustrate the point 
that if the defendants prevail in this action they 
will thereby gain title to a strip of property vary-
ing in width from 9 to 15lf2 feet and 330 feet in 
length in addition to the property described in 
their deeds, and that the plaintiffs will lose the 
same strip of property." 
The quotation of the appellants above stated is not 
true for the reason that it ignores the existence of old 
established fences north of the \Yilliams and Oliver 
property. In order to make the quotation of the appel-
lants true, both Oliver and vVilliams would have to volun-
tarily agre~e to move their fences or the Respondent 
Garle1tt would have to bring and prevail in a lawsuit 
against Oliver and the Respondent Pittman would have 
to bring and prevail in a lawsuit against Williams. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
The statmnent of Appellants found in their conclu-
sion on page 69 of their brief that "if the description 
in the deed controls each party will receive all the prop-
erty called for in his deed without financial loss to any-
one" is erroneous for the reasons .above stated and would 
be more nearly correct if it read as follows: 
If the description in the deed controls the 
Appellants will get what they want without finan-
cial loss to themselves or anyone except the Res-
pondents. 
The contenrtion of appellants that all the parties will 
get what is called for in their deeds is not only untrue 
under the f.acts existing in this case for the reasons above 
stated, but the same argument was considered by the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah in the case of Willie 
v. Local Realty Co., 110 Utah 523, 175 P. 2d 718, reading 
from page 723 of said Pacific Reporter, the court said: 
"Defendant contends that there is no dispute 
or uncertainty about the division line in this case 
because the deeds were clear and certain and each 
lot had the full frontage called for by the deeds 
and therefore the rule relating to es1tablishment 
of boundaries by acquiescence does not apply. It 
is true that the line called for by the deeds could 
h.ave easily been ascertained by a survey. How-
ever, a boundary line may be 'uncertain' or 'in 
dispute' even though it is capable of being readily 
ascertained. The vital question is wherther the 
adjacent owners when they fixed the line acquies-
ced in its being fixed were uncertain or in dispute 
about the location of the actual line. * * * The 
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line thus fixed and recognized is binding on all 
their grantees and successors in interest." 
The above quotation was cited with approval by the 
Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Ekberg v. Bates, 
supra, at page 207 of the Pacific Reporter. 
CONCLUSION 
The £acts found in the instant case clearly bring it 
within the rule .announced in Holmes v. Judge, and fol-
lowed by the Utah Supreme Court in an unbroken line of 
cases to date. It is respectfully submitted that the find-
ings of fact, eonclusions of law, and decree of the trial 
court are fully supported by the evidence and are proper 
in every respect, and that the judgment of the trial court · 
fairly rendered without any "pre-conceived notions" 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MELICH and RUGGERI 
by Robert H. Ruggeri 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Respondents, Emit T. Pittman, 
Hannah B. Pittman, and 
Mattie .A.. Garlett 
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